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a patient to accept the reality of a co nditi o n, a co mpetent jud gment may be difficult. 
Beauchamp and McCullough recogn ize that rationality or ab ilit y to understand a situation 
does not mea n that a patien t can make a competent dec ision. 
The authors c hallenge the notion that the physician must a lways act in the best interes ts 
of the patient and they hold that third party interests ma y be pro moted at t he expe nse of the 
patient in so me cases. They would allow psychological a nd e moti o nal conseque nces of 
treatment to justify withholding beneficial trea tme nts from infan ts, for insta nce. But the 
reasons they give for upholding third-party inte rests are quite vague, abstract. form a l and 
difficult to apply in concrete circumstances. They ho ld tha t the pa ti ent' s interes ts only 
impose a primajacie dut y that can be overridden when so d o ing brings about a grea ter 
good. 
Determining when one can promote third part y interests is done by weighing va rious 
harms and benefits, which is essentiall y a co nseq uen tialist ana lys is. The funda mental 
problem with this met hod o logy is that one never knows what harms and benefit s are to be 
includ ed and one ne ve r knows when to stop sea rc hing for vlllues to be weighed. Whe n they 
urge that patient interests either be upheld or overridden, the authors invoke benefice nce, 
but they neve r sho w why there is a clear dut y to act bene fi cently as beneficence cou ld 
plausibly compel action in another direction. They invoke the " best interests" standa rd 
either to warrant or prohibit paternalist ic action, but they ne ve r give pers uasive reasons 
why this purely formal standard requires their reco mmended action. 
This book was quite dissatisfying because it relies so lely on abstract and formal 
principles. The authors almost seem fearful of esta bli s hing concrete, binding moral norms 
for medical practice, and one suspects that they want medical-ethical norms to be purely 
formal so that these norms ca n be used to permit or prohibit whatever they desire. There is 
no discuss ion of basic human goods or the virtues, which is ve ry peculiar for a work in 
medical ethics. They seem to assume that justice will be achieved by merely acting 
beneficentl y or by protecting autonomy, however they a re defined. 
The formalit y and abstractness of contemporary ethics should be a matter of concern, as 
we now see a campaign to legali ze euthanasia brea king upon our co untry. There is virtually 
no mention of the dut y to trea t patients, and only occasionally is there any mention made ofa 
"therapeutic privilege". They fail to consider the nature of medical treatme nts and the 
conditions of patients to show how those impinge upon the moral character of judgments. 
This book seems to be an endorsement of the pure and contentless patient autonomy model 
which all but obliterates ethical duties and obligations of hea lth care providers. If it is true 
that thi s model is gaining do minance in our country, then it might be necessary to take 
measures to protect the duti es and obligations of physicia ns to proVi de care and trea tment 
for medically vulnerable persons. 
-Rev, Robert Barry, ,O,P" Ph,D , 
National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow 
Washington , D ,C. 
I deal, Fact, and Medicine 
by Charles J. Dougherty 
Ne>!' York: Universill' of America Press. 1985. 202 pp. 
"It might be said by some tha t thi s whole work is far too relativistic, that it accepts too 
easily the claim that there are other significant moral alternatives, and that it therefore 
provides no absolute foundation for the choice of these idea ls and the associated ethical 
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th eory. In res ponse. I a dmitt o a good degree of re lat iv is m" (p. 172). With these words. the 
aut ho r. a professo r o f ethi cs a t Creighton Univers it y in Oma ha. Ne braska. prese nts us with 
a succ inct rcv iew of his anal ys is of ethi ca l theo ry as applied to pro blem a reas of medical 
ethi cs . bas in g h is ethical an a lysis up o n a synthes is of the th o ught o f the Englis h em oto vists 
and the large ly subj ect ive Ka nti a n id ea l of perso na l autonom y. Dougherty s tresses 
instru cti o n o f va lues as the ba sis o f mo ra lit y a nd sta tes that ethi cs s hould refine and clarify 
mora l in structi o ns. 
When discussing medica l researc h. Dougherty ex presses shock and horror at the human 
research protoco ls carried o ut by the Naz i medi ca l expe rim enters (p . 143) . After desc ribing 
so me o f the horrors perpetrat ed during the seco nd World War. Doughert y ri ghtl y points 
out that the ideo logv w hich allowed such experiments deve lo ped well before the seco nd 
World War. But. iro nica lly . w hen assigning ca uses fo r the Naz is' abuse of human right s. 
Doughert y fail s to li st the type o f re lat iv isti c ethica l theory w hi ch he es po uses. 
The best pa rt of the book is a stud y of the e thica l and lega l respons ib ili t ies of hos pitals. 
Most of the signifi cant lega l decisions in rega rd to hospi tal care are prese nt ed and a ve ry 
c lear li st of patient rig ht s and hospi tal duti es is afforded. In thi s secti o n especia lly. 
D o ughert y di splays a co mprehens ive view of the va lues and act ions which wo uld im prove 
inst itutional health ca re. 
-Rev. Kevin O' Rourke. O.P. 
Director 
Center for Health Care Ethics 
SI. I.ouis University Medical Center 
Ethicsfrom a TheocentricPerspective, Vol.} 
Theology and Ethics 
by James M. Gustafson 
Chicago: Ulli" ersill ' o( Chicago Press, 1983. 345 PI'- $ 10.95. 
Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective, Vol. 2 
Ethics and Theology 
by James M. Gustafson 
Chicago: Unilwsill ' o( Chicago Press. 1984. 3261'1'- $25. 
These two works complement each other. The first develo ps a theocentric perspective; 
the second sets out to exp lore the ques tion. What diffe rence does a theocentric persp ecti ve 
make to the interpreta tion of moralit y" Together they constitute an intriguing and thought-
provoking study. While the work of an y Christian et hici st or moral theo logian presupposes 
ce rtain theological positions. it is rare to find these e laborated systematically and at length. 
A serious reader is compelled to grapple w ith man y of the most basic religious issues and 
86 Linacre Quarterly 
